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ABSTRACT A large majority of studies on differentiation focus their attention on the historical development and/or institutional designs of closer or enhanced cooperation in the EU, neglecting similar developments in other regions, for example, the pathfinder in APEC. In comparing cooperation in the EU with the pathfinder in APEC, this article aims to discover conditions of development of differentiation and its impact on the integration as a whole, and to present a few theoretical insights gained from this comparison. This paper begins with a critical review of the literature on the differentiation development in Europe and Asia. Then, from the framework inspired from liberal intergovernmentalism, the author  comparatively analyzes enhanced cooperation in the EU and the pathfinder in APEC, and as a conclusion, evaluate the probable contribution of this analysis to better understanding differentiation and the development of integration theory.






Differentiation has become the focus among scholars of regional integration study since the second half of the 1990s. As it becomes increasingly difficult to reach a consensus between all of the members of an enlarging regional polity, differentiation has become an effective alternative to general integration as a method in which to unify neighboring countries. Nonetheless, a large majority of studies on differentiation focus their attention specifically on the historical development and/or institutional designs of closer or enhanced cooperation in the EU (European Union), neglecting similar developments in other regions, for example, the pathfinder in APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). Few efforts have ever been made to compare these similar movements in different regions or theorize upon the differentiation process in general. Thus, the politics of differentiation is absent in the theoretical debates or comparative studies concerning transnational integration. In comparing cooperation in the EU with the pathfinder in APEC, this article aims to discover conditions of development of differentiation and its impact on the integration as a whole, and to present a few theoretical insights gained from this comparison. This paper begins with a critical review of the literature on the differentiation development in Europe and Asia, followed by a search for an appropriate framework of analysis inspired by integration theories. From this framework, I will comparatively analyze enhanced cooperation in the EU and the pathfinder in APEC, and as a conclusion, will evaluate the probable contribution of this analysis to better understanding differentiation, in particular, and the development of integration theory, in general.

Theoretical Debate and Framework of Analysis

Comparability between EU and APEC

Although both EU and APEC are regionally integrated entities, they do not share enough common features to employ the ‘most similar systems design’ (MSSD) in this comparison. They are both sui generis in world politics. Based upon the treaties and perhaps a constitution in the future, the EU is neither a state nor an IGO, but is qualified as “less than a federation, more than a regime”.​[1]​ Created in the aftermath of a common declaration of the twelve founding states in Camberra in 1989, APEC is “the only intergovernmental grouping in the world operating on the basis of non-binding commitments, open dialogue and equal respect for the views of all participants”.​[2]​ In the institutional design, EU has developed some state-like executive, legislative and judicial mechanisms to implement laws and policies while APEC maintains its intergovernmental structure, which is characterized by regular meetings at different governmental levels. Today some 18,000 Eurocrats work for the European Commission but less than fifty officials are employed in the secretariat of APEC in Singapore. While the Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) has become the general rule in the Council decision-making of the EU, consensus still reins at all the meetings in APEC. If the EU has established a constitutional order based upon the rule of law, APEC puts its emphasis on voluntarism, leaving member states full freedom to implement its decisions. If European integration has been in pursuit of polity-building since its foundation, APEC is limited to facilitating “economic growth, cooperation, trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region”.​[3]​ Fisher’s speech at Humboldt in 2000 has rekindled the debate over whether the European integration is leading toward the creation of a federation, while the vulnerability of APEC in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 1997 gave rise to discussions of whether its funeral had started or whether it had been rendered irrelevant by the ‘ASEAN plus’ projects.​[4]​




Sub-integration refers to an integration that occurs among some but not all members of an already existing integration. According to the objectives it pursues and the institutional framework it employs, sub-integration can occur within four categories as follows. (Table 1)






Not identical	Alienated integration	New integration

Opt-out integration is a sub-integration in pursuit of the same objective as the larger integration but which occurs outside of the latter’s institutional framework. The history of Shengen Agreement, signed June 1985, by France, Germany and Benelux, is an excellent example of opt-out integration. Considering the stubborn hostility from other member states in the EC - particularly the UK – to QMV extension, the five countries decided to sign an agreement outside of the EC but in an integrated pursuit of its objectives. They agreed to “gradually remove their common frontier controls and introduce freedom of movement for all individuals who were nationals of the signatory Member States, other Member States or third countries.”​[14]​ The entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty legally and institutionally incorporated these Shengen acquis into the EU and EC with a protocol. This put an end to the opt-out integration, which has since then been transformed into a differentiated integration. Similar opt-out integration is happening among some members of APEC, which are planning to form a trade zone among all East Asian members of APEC while excluding Taiwan and Hong Kong. This “ASEAN plus three” (APT) project that began in 1997 aims to advance the free trade and particularly the promotion of economic and technical cooperation among its members, an objective of APEC many complain is too often neglected by its Anglo-Saxon member countries. Although the APT, like APEC, is not based on any treaty or formal binding agreement between participating states, and although it has no central secretariat, its “web of relations between the members has grown quickly since the first meeting of the heads of government in 1997.”​[15]​ Their finance, economics and foreign ministers, central bank governors and senior government officials in some domains have started meeting regularly since 1998.​[16]​ All of these meetings have taken place outside of APEC. 
Alienated integration is built up institutionally inside the larger integration but which curiously pursues other objectives than the ones imposed by the larger integration. The emerging European pillar inside NATO belongs to this kind of sub-integration. The original North Atlantic Treaty aims to deter any armed attack from the ex-Soviet Union by imposing Article five, which states that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”. However, the January 1994 NATO Brussels Summit endorsed the concept of the Combined Joint Task Forces, which provides for separable but not separate deployable headquarters that could be used for those European members-led operations. In June 1996, NATO foreign ministers agreed for the first time to build up a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. They also decided to make NATO assets available for WEU (West European Union)-led crisis management operations, which is not among the original objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty.​[17]​ 
New integration occurs outside institutional frameworks and in pursuit of different objectives from the larger integration. However, such new integration is still related to the existing integration because its objectives and institutional mechanism both retain their influence on the existing one. It is therefore new but not novel. The Fouchet Project and Elysée Treaty in early 1960s are qualified as sub-integrations of this kind. The European Political Union Project designed by the French President De Gaulle adopted an intergovernmental cooperation approach with the hope of establishing regular meetings at all levels between member states. Furthermore, it was built up to coordinate or integrate economic, cultural, political and defense capacities between Germany, France, Italy and Benelux, deliberately outside of the then young European Communities. In the aftermath of failure of Fouchet Project, De Gaulle and Adenauer worked together for a bilateral close cooperation and signed the Elysée Treaty in January 1963. According to De Gaulle’s original strategy, the Elysée Treaty should have served as the basis for a later six country-wide cooperative entity, leading to the establishment of the European Political Union that should dominate the existing Communities and reorient the European integration.​[18]​ 
Differentiated integration happens among some members of a larger integration and pursues objectives of and within the same institutional and legal frameworks of this larger integration. Both enhanced cooperation in the EU and pathfinder in APEC are qualified as differentiated integration owing to these institutional and teleological characteristics. In APEC, all the pathfinder initiatives must be “consistent with the Borgor Declaration” and “invigorate progress towards the Bogor Goals”. In adopting the pathfinder initiatives, the APEC members must also respect “principles of voluntarism, comprehensiveness, consensus-based decision-making, flexibility, transparency, open regionalism and differentiated timetables for developed and developing economies”.​[19]​ In the same way, any enhanced cooperation in the EU must be “aimed at furthering the objectives of the Union and of the Community, at protection and serving their interests and at reinforcing their process of integration”. (Article 43.a TEU) It also has to “respect the single institutional framework of the Union”. (Article 43.b TEU) Such teleological and institutional conditions are presented to prevent a successful differentiated integration from dividing or destroying the larger integration, thus establishing a positive correlation between the sub-integration and the larger integration.

Table 2  The sub-integrations in EU and APEC

							       Institutional framework
	Inside	Outside
Identical	Differentiated integrationEnhanced cooperationPathfinder	Opt-outIntegrationShengen AgreementASEAN plus Three(APT)
Non-identical	Alienated integrationEDSI in NATO	New IntegrationFouchet ProjectElysée Treaty


Key issues and framework of analysis

In order to establish such a correlation, two key issues must be addressed. First, when and under what circumstances will the differentiated integration be initiated, accepted and then implemented? Second, how and under what circumstances can a successful differentiated integration contribute to the progress of its larger integration as a whole?
The whole process of differentiation can be divided into four periods, including its ideation, initiation, adoption and implementation. As the differentiated integration must result from intergovernmental negotiations, the member governments or leaders without doubt play a dominant role in this process as liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) argues. Although LI’s rational assumption, economic determinism to a certain degree and negligence of non-static actors are fiercely criticized by other approaches, nobody denies the dominant role of member states in such a constitutive and structural change of regional integration.​[20]​ “It would be folly to suggest that the member states do not play a central part in policy development within the European Union.”​[21]​ 
Even the assumption that member states act as a unitary actor in this process is often the case in the differentiation process. “All the governments have redlines,” admits a Belgian official from the COREPER, “which are well known to each other. For example, UK and Luxemburg will never agree to uniform taxation. We all know that.”​[22]​ “No Austrian government will give green light to the free movement of water,” said an Austrian diplomat at the IGC, “which is our white gold.”​[23]​ “Malaysia,” said an official in the SOM (Senior Official Meeting) of APEC, “will never allow the free trade in APEC to destroy its car industry.”​[24]​ The assumption that a member state will act as a unitary actor shall be accepted in the following analysis until it is falsified. Only those interest group, local authority or ministerial bureaucracy that has focused on this issue and proved to have exercised their influence during formulation of policy preferences of member states shall be particularly analyzed.
However, LI’s rationality of member states or their leaders are often bounded, as historical institutionalism and incrementalism argue. Both approaches suppose that governments quite often have unclear objectives and cannot predict all of the consequences of their decisions. In fact, they may drift into agreements without appreciating their potentially significant implications. They may also avoid making decisions, preferring instead to postpone them while waiting for their implementation and development. They are also often locked by their past decisions into a system where they find it increasingly difficult to reassert their authority.​[25]​ Such an argument based upon bounded rationality necessitates the evaluation of factors other than simply member states in the whole process of differentiation. With reference to John Peterson’s terms,​[26]​ these non-static factors shall be divided into intra- and extra-systemic factors. The intra-systemic factors, as some institutionalists claim, shall include values, norms, rules, laws, decision-making processes and institutional mechanisms of the multi-national integration. The extra-systemic factors are the politico-economic context, which, while outside of multi-national integration, still has a significant impact.
These intra-systemic factors constitute another framework that helps analyze the impact of differentiation upon the integration as a whole. Together, Laffan groups  these factors into regulatory, normative and cognitive pillars.​[27]​ The normative pillar is composed of values and norms. The former indicates the moral dimension and fundamental objectives of the polity while norms “establish a framework for behavior; of how things should be done and what are the legitimate means to pursue certain ends”.​[28]​ These norms also help participants “turn to established or familiar patterns of behavior to attain their purposes”.​[29]​ The cognitive pillar consists of symbols and collective identity. The former is “constitutive of reality, connecting individuals to the social and political order, establishing orientations for interpreting the world around us”. The latter indicates the characteristics of the newborn polity that also distinguish it from others, particularly from its constituent units. The regulatory pillar shall, following Scott and Laffan’s logic, consist of legal acts and institutional design. Legal acts are tools that can only be mobilized with help of institutional mechanisms, both of which then decide the regulatory capacities of the multi-national polity.
The following first sub-section will proceed with analysis of the intra- and extra-systemic factors and intergovernmental interaction in the differentiation processes inside EU and APEC. Based upon the three-pillared institutionalism, the second sub-section will then analyze comparatively the probable impact of enhanced cooperation on the EU and that of pathfinder on the APEC. 
 
Enhanced Cooperation and Pathfinder





In the ideation process, practices preceded ideas of differentiation both in the EU and APEC, which later entered into into policy thinking particularly in the aftermath of failure of other more ambitious sub-integration projects. Until the early 1990s, few political elite or scholars supplied quality analyses on differentiated integration in the EU. The idea of differentiation was revitalized by Delors and Mitterrand, however, in a larger landscape of which the then EC was only part. Deeply worried that a rapidly enlarged EC would suffer from institutional paralysis and budgetary constraint, Delors prevented Commission officials from working on the Austrian application throughout 1990. At the same time, he advocated the idea of a ‘Europe of concentric circles’ of which the then EC was at the center moving toward a federal polity, and was surrounded by the coming EEA (European Economic Area) at the second circle and a vaguely defined third circle of CEECs (Central and Eastern European Countries).​[30]​ Mitterrand proposed the establishment of a European confederation to contain the rapidly unifying Germany, of which the then EC and ex-Soviet Union were two pillars.​[31]​
Nonetheless, de facto differentiation came into existence far earlier than these ideas. As early as 1986, France, Germany and Benelux signed Shengen agreement aiming to establish the free movement of people outside of the Single European Act. The failure of the French-inspired proposals of ‘concentric Europe’ in early 1990s and the entry into effect of the Shengen agreement and convention coincided with the Reflections on European Policy released by CDU/CSU in 1994, which triggered intensive debate over differentiated integration inside the EU.
The first formal idea of differentiation appeared in APEC in 1997 when American and Australian delegations proposed to establish the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) at the Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI) meetings. The EVSL targeted important areas where participant member states promise to facilitate efficient reductions to trade barriers and to ultimately open markets. It is, however, not a proposal for sectoral liberalization but rather a proposal for liberalization by product. Nonetheless, owing to skepticism from Asian countries toward any liberalist proposal after the Asian financial crisis, the Kuala Lumpur Summit in 1998 decided only to refer the EVSL proposals to the WTO. The efforts to achieve the EVSL effectively collapsed.​[32]​




The intensive debate over differentiation triggered by the CDU/CSU proposal resulted in numerous proposals on differentiated integration between 1994 and 1996-1997 IGC; these proposals may be grouped into three categories.​[37]​ A ‘multi-speed integration’ is defined as the mode of differentiated integration in which the pursuit of common objectives is driven by a core group of member states which are both willing and able to pursue some policy areas further, leaving others to follow later. In other words, all member states pursue the same objectives but at different times. A ‘variable geometry’ is a mode of differentiated integration which admits to unattainable differences within the main integrative structure by allowing permanent or irreversible separation between a core of members and lesser developed or simply unwilling units. That is, differentiation will be permanent rather than temporary, leading inevitably to the existence of two or three Europe around a probable noyeau dûr. The third concept is ‘Europe à la Carte’, where member states are free to pick-and-choose which policy area they would like to participate in, while at the same time holding only a minimum number of common objectives. After a series of bilateral contacts at different levels, French and German leaders seem to have opted for the idea of ‘multi-speed integration’ although French governments made it well known that they preferred to a ‘variable geometry’ around Franco-German axis.​[38]​ In December 1995, French and German leaders published a common letter to the EU presidency, announcing their determination to “introduce in the Treaty a disposition that permits states able and willing to develop between member states, based upon the existent experiences, enhanced cooperation inside the institutional frame of the EU”. For “one partner’s momentary difficulties to follow the progress shall not prevent the Union from moving forward or improving its capacities for action.”​[39]​ In November 1996, the French and German governments submitted a common proposal on differentiation at the IGC, which constituted the basis for negotiations among member states.




The real discussion on the Australian initiative took place at the CTI (Committee on Trade and Investment) and SOM in APEC between 2000 and 2001; however, it unfolded without substantive debate. Though a significant number of Asian countries did not like to see any proposal for further liberalization from their Western partners in the post-currency crisis period, “no Asian government would like to be seen as an obstacle on the way towards Bogor goals”.​[46]​ But favorable voices also disappeared at the meetings, as some Asian countries were reluctant to make clear their support, fearing that they would be perceived by their neighbors as blind followers of the US-Australia’s axis. 
“The pathfinder initiative is totally in our national interests,” said a high ranking official in Taipei, “but we could not speak out our support at the meetings. Chinese delegation was always watching our reaction to any proposal from US and Australia. Chinese are worried that we would profit of this Australia-US axis to strengthen our identity in APEC. In such a case, they will mobilize other Asian neighbors to oppose fiercely any proposal.”​[47]​ 
As historical institutionalists and incrementalists argue, those who were skeptical about further liberalization have no clear objectives on this novel issue and cannot predict all the consequences of their decisions. They drifted into agreements without appreciating their potentially significant implications, preferring to postpone their real opposition while waiting for their implementation and development. The SOM in March 2001 formally endorsed the pathfinder initiative. In October 2001, the APEC summit adopted the Shanghai Accord. The accords officially established the pathfinder approach in which capable and willing countries can forge ahead with market opening measures even if other members are not ready to follow.
At the IGC 1996-1997, differentiation was a novel issue but totally out of the core debate among member states of the EU. The core issues related to the extension of the QMV and co-decision process, re-weighing of voting in the Council and resizing of the Commission vis-à-vis the coming eastward enlargement, incorporation of WEU into the EU and communitarization of the JHA even though a majority of governments had ambiguous objectives and the whole negotiation process took place in indirection to a certain degree.​[48]​ The question of flexibility relates intensively to the extension of QMV, where the predictable British veto seemed to persuade those integration-minded countries led by France and Germany to exploit a new approach to advance the EU-building. “The Belgian government was among the pioneers of enhanced cooperation,” said a Belgian official from Attichi, “for it searched for a new role and strategy to play inside a larger and more federal Europe.”​[49]​ Like on many other issues, member governments often agree to the ‘grand idea’ of flexibility without, however, detailing their exact positions during the negotiation process. It seems that they prefer to make clear only their ‘red lines’ on this novel issue while waiting for its implementation and later development. 




After the adoption of ‘closer cooperation’ by the IGC in 1997, differentiation in the EU was addressed in two amendments at the IGC in Nice in 2000 and Convention-IGC in Brussels in 2002-2004. However, as of yet, no enhanced cooperation has been formally applied. Regarding the pathfinder in APEC, eight initiatives have been endorsed since its adoption and in 2004 the implementation process was substantively reformulated.
According to the Shanghai Accord, a pathfinder in APEC can be agreed upon if it:​[55]​
-	is ‘consistent with the Bogor Declaration;
-	respects ‘APEC principles of voluntarism, comprehensiveness, consensus-based decision-making, transparency, open regionalism and differentiated timetables for developed and developing economies’;
-	‘provide a framework to encourage broader participation through enhanced capacity building programs’;
-	is ‘transparent and open’.
The whole Accord does not, however, clarify the adoption process of pathfinder initiatives. Instead, according to later practices, they are all agreed at the annual APEC summit, based upon proposals submitted by Ministerial Meetings and SOM. The very first step takes place at the CTI meetings. 
“Any member country can submit a one or two-paged paper at the CTI meetings, mentioning their willing to start a pathfinder on a specific issue. Generally it will have got an explicit support from at least one other member country through bilateral contacts before presenting it openly at the meetings. In principle, no country opposes it and the chairperson announces its adoption, which will be transferred to SOM, Ministerial Meeting and the summit.
“If participation of the pathfinder initiative necessitates signature of treaties, like the case of Kyoto convention on customs procedure, the lead economy will forward the documents to sign, of which each member country keeps one copy, binding them all. As APEC is not a strictly defined IGO, neither formal signature nor official deposit is needed.” ​[56]​
Among the eight pathfinder initiatives that came into existence between 2002 and 2004, six were presented by Australia, one by Singapore and one by the US. 
“The implementation process of pathfinders is similar to all the other policies of APEC. All participant member countries define their own individual action plans and report their progress annually at the CTI and SOM meetings, where the lead economies give a general review of this pathfinder.
“It depends much on the lead economy. Those Australia-initiated pathfinders developed rapidly, which attracted more member countries to join in. Australians have worked hard through bilateral or multi-lateral talks to implement those pathfinder initiated by them. On the contrary, the Singapore-proposed pathfinder on electronic certificate of origin remains paperwork. Nothing really happens since its establishment.” ​[57]​ 
As for the US-led pathfinder on digital economy, member countries of APEC did not reach a real consensus, particularly on the subject of intellectual property and the liberalization of e-products. The ministerial meeting at Las Cabos in October 2002 endorses six pathfinders but only ‘recommends’ that the summit adopt the “Statement to Implement the APEC Policies on Trade and the Digital Economy” as a pathfinder. Similarly the later summit ‘endorsed’ all pathfinders other than the one on digital economy, which is only “adopted…as a pathfinder initiative”.
In 2004, the APEC pathfinder experienced fundamental reforms, leading to its further institutionalization.​[58]​ Before establishing a pathfinder initiative endorsed by the summit, member countries must first proceed with an ‘interim pathfinder’ for at least one year. A three country quorum is needed to launch an interim pathfinder, which can be endorsed by the CTI without being submitted to higher levels. The interim pathfinder will be reviewed on an annual basis by the CTI or appropriate working groups and could to become a pathfinder if:
-	more than 25% member countries participate in it from the very beginning. Among the 21 member countries, six are needed.
-	the lead economy develops a detailed proposal, elaborating the objectives, implementation and proposed outcomes.
Then the CTI will propose to SOM that the interim initiative be granted Pathfinder status. On the basis of advice from CTI or the relevant working group, SOM would decide whether to continue a Pathfinder in its current form, or invite the lead country to revise it to better fit members’ views. If, after three years of its implementation, less than 50% of member countries participate in the pathfinder or there appears to be little prospect of membership increasing in the short-term, SOM might decide to terminate it. SOM, composed of directors general of Foreign Ministries from member countries, plays now a dominant role in the implementation process of differentiation.
 Through the end of 2004, eight pathfinders in APEC have been established. (Table 3)

Table 3	Established Pathfinders in APEC

Pathfinder	Lead economy	EndorsementYear	Membership
Advance Passenger Information (API)	Australia	2002	At, Ca, NZ, US, Th.1
E-Cert Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)	Australia and New Zealand	2002	Au, Ca, NZ, SG, CT, US
Kyoto Convention	Australia	2002	AU, CH, CA, JP, KR, ML,NZ, US.2
Electrical Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA)	Australia	2002	AU, NZ, SG.3
Electronic Certificates of Origin	Singapore	2002	KR, SG, CT
Trade the Digital Economy	US	2002	All but China and Russia
Corporate governance	Australia	2002	AU, KR, ML, MX, NZ, SG
Food MRA	Australia	2003	ML, SG, CT, TH, VN
1.	Though all member countries have agreed on API, only these five have fully implemented it.
2.	Chile, Chinese Taipei, Mexico, PNG, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand participate only in Part A of Kyoto Convention, which refers to “an intention by the economy to adopt the provisions of the revised Convention”.​[59]​
3.	Brunei, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, PNG, the Philippines, Chinese Taipei, Thailand and Vietnam participate only in Part I of Electric MRA.
Source: 2004 Committee on Trade and Investment Annual Report to Ministers, Appendix IV.

The differentiation design in the EU evolved at the successive IGCs and ended with the adoption of a Constitution for the EU in June 2004. At the IGC 1996, which aimed to put an end to this partial cooperation outside the TEU and TEC, the enhanced cooperation was first established in the first and third pillars with the so-called emergency brake similar to the Luxembourg Compromise. The Treaty of Nice extended this cooperation to the CFSP, while the emergency brake was lifted in the first and third pillars. The Constitutional Treaty made a further step in lifting this brake in the field of CFSP (Art. III-325) and established the ‘structured cooperation’ in ESDP (Art. III-213).
Based upon the single institutional framework, enhanced cooperation shall be initiated and implemented inside the same EU/EC institutional structures. In the Community, any member state shall submit its request to the Commission, which will then forward its proposal to the Council. With regard to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the Member States shall submit their demands either to the Commission or directly to the Council if they are ignored by the Commission. In both cases, the Council shall then act by QMV on a Commission’s proposal or the  Member States’ initiative. If any member state requests that the matter be referred to the European Council, the Council can only act by QMV after the matter has been raised in the European Council (TEU Art. 40b and TEC Art. 11.2). In the area of the CFSP, member states that wish to establish an enhanced cooperation shall address a request directly to the Council. The request shall then be forwarded to the EP for information and to the Commission for reviewed opinions on the consistency between the request and EU policies. The Council then acts by QMV unless any member state intends to oppose its adoption. The Council then may act by QMV to refer this matter to the European Council, which shall make its decision unanimously (TEU Art. 23 and 27c). Any member state can consequently issue a de facto veto at the Council and later at the European Council (TEU Art. 23 and 27c), thought not in matters concerning military or defense (TEU Art. 27b). Any member state that wishes to participate in the enhanced cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council and the Commission. In principle, within four months, the Council shall act by QMV if it concerns the CFSP or former JHA (TEU Art. 27e and 40b). In the Community field, the Commission instead of the Council will make the decision. (TEC Art. 11a). 
What kind of legal instruments will be employed to implement the enhanced cooperation? Title VII of the TEU allows the member states to participate in the enhanced cooperation to adopt ‘acts and decisions’ for such an implementation. According to Articles 27a.2 and 40.1 of TEU and Article11.3 of TEC, it means that all the legal instruments in each pillar of the EU shall be respectively employed to implement the enhanced cooperation. In the execution of enhanced cooperation in the EC, the ECJ shall have jurisdiction over all these acts. Such a jurisdiction is excluded from the enhanced cooperation in the field of the CFSP and becomes a conditional one on the subject of the former JHA. Article 35 of the TEU establishes a new jurisdiction which is purely voluntary as far as the member states are concerned. In the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the ECJ has jurisdiction to the extent that a member state decides to accept that jurisdiction.​[60]​ This mechanism resulted from a compromise between France and Germany, which sought to institutionalize this partial integration, and others led by the UK, which tried their best to handicap its functioning.​[61]​ As a result, enhanced cooperation has been legalized since 1998 but has not yet been ‘operated’. 

Influence of the sub-integration





Both in EU and APEC, differentiation employs the same legal or pseudo-legal tools as those of general integration. All legal acts in the EU and soft law in APEC may be mobilized to implement enhanced cooperation or pathfinder initiatives. Consequently, all legal principles developed during the integration shall prevail in the differentiation process. For example, the legal or pseudo-legal acts adopted to implement the differentiation shall enjoy statuses such as supremacy, immediate applicability and direct effect in the EU and voluntarism and loyal applicability in APEC. Several legal or pseudo-legal sub-systems and some form of differentiation acquis that is integrated and superior to those in its matrix may be established inside the integration as a whole. So, how could these sub-systems and those non-participant member countries be legally bridged to the constitutive system?
In scenario one, law and rules resulting from differentiation are recognized as an integral part of its general legal structure that all newcomers must accept before their accession. As for those non-participant member countries, they enjoy total immunity and freedom to take part in some or all provisions of this acquis. Incorporation of Shengen acquis falls into this category. Scenario two obliges the ins and outs to reach such formal agreements that legally bridge the two camps of differentiation. The ‘European Monetary System (EMS)-bis’ and ‘Pact of Growth and Stability’ adopted by European Council in Amsterdam in 1997 belongs to this kind of arrangement. In scenario three, all participant member countries issue an understanding, endorsed by all, at the moment of their accession to the differentiation; this statement of understanding makes clear their attitudes towards this differentiation as well as those non-participant member countries. For example, when Chile agreed to adhere to the pathfinder on the digital economy in 2003, it reiterated that no “separate and distinct” judicial systems will be hence established to curtail “trade in infringing and counterfeit goods using e-commerce”.​[62]​
On the institutional issues, both EU and APEC insist upon a single framework, refusing any initiative to establish new institutions. However, several scenarios exist that differ in their tolerance for sub-institutionalization. Scenario A refuses any new structure, maintaining the same as for the whole integration. Under such a circumstance, all non-participant member countries can effectively influence the differentiation process through the same institutional structure. For example, all members of the EU institutions participate in the implementation of Shengen acquis. Scenario B accepts creation of some informal structures that organize participant member countries, but taking no step to legalize these structures or give them decision-making powers. The ‘Euro 12’ reunites all Ecofin ministers of Euroland - outside the Council of Ministers - to debate any policy relating to the single currency without, however, giving them the power to make a decision. Scenario C divides the implementation process into two periods after its establishment. All member countries participate in the deliberation but only those participant member countries can vote on the issue concerned; this scenario is illustrated well in the enhanced cooperation in the EU. Scenario D completely excludes the influence of participant member countries in the differentiation implementation. Though no sub-structure is established, the whole implementation process has a de facto exclusion for those staying outside of the structure. The implementation of pathfinder initiatives in APEC depends much on the willingness and capacity of lead economy to proceed through bilateral diplomacy, a network composed of bilateral cooperation around the lead economy appears, which exists totally outside of those non-participant member countries. The API system is installed in Camberra and the SPS e-certificate designed by Australian government is even registered as an intellectual property in WIPO, to which a non-participant has no access. Accordingly, scenario I-A inclines to prevent any regulatory diversification resulting from differentiation while scenario III-D leads to the creation of a regulatory sub-system quasi-independent from the regulatory regime of the general integration. (Figure 1)
















Differentiation inevitably casts doubt on the values of equality and solidarity as well as the norm of consensus-building in the integration as a whole. The key issue here is how to justify enhanced cooperation in the context of the whole integration. “Non-participant member states [of enhanced cooperation],” said a British leading MEP, “would never be quite sure that their interests were being protected by the arrangements, and the suspicion of discrimination would be ever present.”​[63]​ 
Above all, differentiation developed from the opt-out or de facto partial integration practices in both the EU and APEC. In the late 1980s, Great Britain was privileged not to sign the Social Protocol and, together with Denmark, not to implement the single currency. The pathfinder was initiated by Australia, taking lessons from its earlier ideas on the APEC Business Travel Card Scheme. All of these opt-outs or partial integration did not prove to destroy or deter the integration as a whole. Quite on the contrary, the single currency would never have been launched without those opt-outs in the EU​[64]​ and the Kyoto convention would never have been effective among member countries of APEC without pathfinder initiatives. Following the same logic, the partial integration based upon enhanced cooperation or the pathfinder initiatives could contribute to a great deal to European or Asia-Pacific integration as well. More important, differentiation was formally incorporated into the existing integration in order to ‘delegitimize’ similar cooperation among member states outside the EU or APEC. Without enhanced cooperation or pathfinder initiatives, cooperation outside EU or APEC may grow strong enough to replace or threaten the structures of the existing integration. If the differentiation project is rejected, cooperation on defense outside the EU might come into existence among France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. If APEC continues to stagnate owing to its consensual tradition, it might be surpassed in the near future by the ‘ASEAN plus Three’ as the leading force in regional integration. “Enhanced cooperation already exists outside the Treaties (Eurocorps, EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR, etc.), formalizing it would allow these initiatives to be brought into the Union”.​[65]​ For a majority of the member states, making flexibility or enhanced cooperation “within the Union’s institutional system [is] more attractive than interstate cooperation outside the institutional system”.​[66]​ Enhanced cooperation aims therefore to save rather than destroy the European integration. 
Thirdly, like subsidiarity and open methods, differentiation was first created as a result of the new integration paradigm developed since the early 1990s in order to reconstruct the legitimacy of both EU and APEC. This new paradigm calls into doubt the uniform regulation model developed in the 1950s and 1960s and emphasizes its respect towards the diversity of the member states as well as their discretion to implement the regional polity.​[67]​ According to this logic, an Italian delegate at the Constitutional Convention insists that enhanced cooperation should be extended to the ESDN. “[The EU] is too big and heterogeneous, especially in the light of its future enlargement. Only a minority of countries in such a large Europe will have the political will and the material means to take part in military actions”.​[68]​ In APEC, the financial crisis and the failure of EVSL project casts doubt onto the absolute consensual tradition. Threatened by the increasing regional integration projects from China and ASEAN as well as the multiplication of FTA among constituents of APEC, those APEC-minded member countries cannot help but exploit the new approach to achieve integration based on the structures of APEC. “Now, only Australia, Singapore and Korea are serious about APEC. Japan is half-half. For Taiwan, it is one of the rare international organizations of which it is a full member. They all are worried that APEC will be weakened or dematerialized.”​[69]​
The behavioral code in pursuit of differentiation continues this justification effort. The first principle is equality without equity, similar to that in the design of weighted votes in the Council of EU. All member states can require initiating a differentiation among themselves if they are more than eight in the EU or three in APEC. Differentiation, once established, shall be open to all member countries at any time. Another important principle is solidarity. Although some member states can launch differentiation, they have to respect the competences, rights and obligations of those Member States which do not participate therein. Moreover, those participating in differentiation shall ensure that as many member countries as possible have been encouraged to take part. In other words, those participating in differentiation shall make some effort to help outsiders qualify to participate in partial integration programs. On the contrary, when participating member states adopt acts and decisions to implement differentiation, the non-participant member countries shall not impede the implementation thereof by the participating member states. Last but not least, all efforts to establish differentiation shall respect what the EU or APEC has achieved, that is, the acquis. Nonetheless, it shall not form part of the integration acquis that accession countries have to all accept. 

Table 4	Values and norms of differentiation
Shaken values 	Equality, solidarity
Re-established values	-  Legalization of de facto practices-  New paradigm of integration-  Delegitimization of opt-out integration
Shaken norms	Consensus-searching




Will the differentiation create a separate identity with its own symbols, which in turn dominates the original integration and splits it?
Among the eight existing pathfinder initiatives of APEC, Australian government launched six out of eight pathfinder initiatives and a core group around Camberra appears to exist. (Table 5) Australia, Canada, New Zealand, US, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea seem to emerge as leading member countries in this differentiation process while China and ASEAN countries with exception of Singapore are in general excluded from this development. Regarding Japan, the leading economy in East Asia, it also seems to have lagged behind in the sub-integration competition.

Table 5	A core group among pathfinder initiatives of APEC
























Will this core group emerge as a solid sub-integration that threatens, damages or splits APEC? It seems not. Institutionally, like all forms of differentiation, it happens under the APEC structures and bound by solidarity-related clauses. Politically, all seven of these member countries have no interest in seeing APEC weakened or split into two integrations separately led by US-Australia in Pacific and China-ASEAN in East Asia.
In the EU, France, Germany, Benelux, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Austria all are members of Shengen area and Euroland. Ireland and Finland has adopted the euro as their currency while Sweden and Denmark participate in the free movement of persons. At the Convention and IGC from 2002 to 2004, French, German, Belgian and Luxembourg governments reiterated their decision to achieve cooperation on defense, which got support from UK and Italy. Will a sub-integration around the six founding member states develop into an avant-garde in the EU that grows so fast it will become a new integration outside of the existing structure? Such a possibility should not be totally excluded because it echoes well the famous ‘Europe of three circles’ proposed by French leaders between in 1994-1995.​[70]​ “It is French dream to re-establish a Europe between the six without particularly the British participation,” said a leading French historian, “which will permit once again France an opportunity to become a grande nation with support of a smaller Europe in the 21st century.”​[71]​ However, as differentiation is strictly contained in the EU structures and under surveillance of all political leaders as well as the public, it shall be quite difficult to constitute such a directoire based on any ideas of concentric Europe.
Regarding the public opinion, according to the most recent Eurobarometer, a majority of European Union citizens (61%) say “they rather agree with a proposal according to which the Member States that so wish could increase their cooperation without waiting for the others”. In particular, unlike the situation observed for the other proposals, a firmer rate of acceptance for this proposal in countries that tend to be more ‘Eurosceptical’ like the United Kingdom (67%) or Poland (72%) is evident.​[72]​ “The British elite and people do not seriously fear that enhanced cooperation damage their core interests. For example, partial integration on taxation shall merely result in more foreign direct investment (FDI) fleeing to the UK.”​[73]​
	Nonetheless, at the Constitutional Convention between 2002 and 2003, several representatives from CEECs did not hide their deep worries and fears that such flexibility will lead to a structured discrimination against small and late-coming member states in the EU. “A mechanism of solidarity with those remaining outside the enhanced cooperation,” said Mr. Adrian Severin, MP from Romania, “should be guaranteed with the European Commission playing a stronger role as a mediator”.​[74]​ According to the Bulgarian government, in the area of CFSP/ESDP, any member state seeking to protect its immediate national security should retain veto power.​[75]​ “In the present situation of the European defense policy,” said the Polish parliamentary representative, “it is too early to create some ‘exclusive’ forms of cooperation in the military matters.” The Poles have serious doubts as to the concept of “structured cooperation in the military and defense affairs”.​[76]​ For them, openness and solidarity shall be basic principles of the enhanced cooperation while acquis as well as rights of those outside of it shall not be affected.​[77]​ The British MEP, Mr. Duff, concluded the probable negative impacts upon the EU structures: 




Political and institutional dissimilarities between the EU and APEC permit scholars to compare their nearly simultaneous sub-integrations since mid 1990s on the basis of MDSD. The categorization of sub-integrations makes it clear that enhanced cooperation and pathfinder both belong to differentiated integration that happens inside the same institutional framework with identical teleological settings as their matrix. From ideation to initiation, some prototyped practices preceded the proposals, which were officially presented only after some other more ambitious projects proved to be non-starters. The adoption process mainly depends on intergovernmental negotiations despite the fact that a majority of countries truly drifted into agreements without appreciating exactly their potentially significant implications while waiting for their implementation and development. Regarding new conceptions, member countries seem to prefer to hide their opposition or suspicion and usually do not adopt a categorical opposition. Compared to clear-cut issues and debate, their interests in new conceptions may be still vague. In particular, both differentiation in the EU and APEC generally have been established first with general principles, leaving the operational mechanism to be fixed later. Few countries prefer to veto it at this beginning moment.
Nonetheless, development of differentiation diverges in its implementation in the EU and APEC. As APEC has established eight pathfinder initiatives since 2002, the enhanced cooperation has never been utilized since the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into effect in 1998. Different from the EU, APEC first created a loosely structured framework for the pathfinder initiatives, which were then ceaselessly reviewed and modified. A more detailed mechanism was established in 2004, which divides the differentiation in APEC into three periods: interim pathfinder, formal pathfinder and review process. As the uniform regulation model is leaving, to be replaced by a new paradigm based upon its respect toward the diversity of its constituent units, open regionalism and soft law system developed by APEC is no less capable than the legal order created by the EU in facilitation the differentiation.
Enhanced cooperation and pathfinder also diverge in their impact on regional integration. Compared to the former, the latter is more inclined to develop a separate regulatory pillar inside APEC. A core group around Australia-US also seems to have appeared inside APEC, though no member of this core group finds any interest in seeing APEC split into an Asia dominated jointly by China-ASEAN and a Pacific led by Australia-US axis.
	The whole analysis also seems to have reconfirmed the values of LI in its comparison of differentiation in the EU and APEC. Though member states are not always the unique actors in these processes, they are without doubt the dominant ones. On the issue of differentiation, few regional, bureaucratic or supranational actors influence the process as much as leaders and governments of member countries. LI is particularly privileged in the comparative analyses of EU and other regional polities as the latter, quite often, is far less supranational or institutionalized as the former. LI therefore supplies a useful and flexible framework of analysis that permits scholars to compare similar developments between regional integrations around the world.





APEC. 2004 Committee on Trade and Investment Annual Report to Ministers, Appendix IV.
APEC. Shanghai Accord, adopted by APEC Economic Leaders on 21 October 2001.
APEC. Statement to Implement APEC Policies on Trade and the Digital Economy, Annex A. Los Cabos, Mexico on 27 October 2002, Bangkok, Thailand on 21 October 2003.”
APEC document 2002/SOM III/002.
Bergsten, Fred, “Towards a Tripartite World”, The Economist, 15 July 2000: 22.
Chirac, Jacques and Kohl, Helmut. Declaration of Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac to President of European Council, (​http:​/​​/​europa.eu.int​/​en​/​agenda​/​igc-home​/​ms-doc​/​state-fr​/​kohl.html​) 7 December 1995.
Chu, Chin-peng, “Regionalism and Regional Integration in the Asia-Pacific and the European Union: Theoretical Discussion and Development Experience”, in Christopher M. Dent and David W.F. Huang eds., Northeast Asian Regionalism: Learning from the European Union, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002: 34-64.
Denman, Brian, “The Emergence of Trans-Regional Educational Exchange Schemes (TREES) in Europe, North America, and the Asia-Pacific Region”, Higher Education in Europe, 26(1), 2001: 95-108.
Dini, Lamberto, “The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”. CONV 180/02.
Duff ,Andrew, “Do We Really Need Enhanced Cooperation?”, CONV 759/03.
Elek, Andrew, “Open Regionalism Going Global: APEC and the New Transatlantic Economic Partnership”, Pacific Economic Paper, No. 286, December 1998: 1-32.
Endo, Ken, “The Security Foundations of Economic Integration: A Comparison between East Asia and Western Europe”, in Christopher M. Dent and David W.F. Huang eds., Northeast Asian Regionalism: Learning from the European Union, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002: 226-242.
Grant, Charels, Deors – Inside the House that Jacques Built, London: Nicholas Brealey, 1994: 128-143.
Hall, Peter and Taylor, Rosemary, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, Political Studies, 44(5), 1999: 936-957.
Hugo, Graeme John, “Regional Patterns of International Cooperation on Migration Issues in Asia, Present and Future: Australia”, Keynote Report.
Kahler, Miles, “A World of Blocs: Facts and Factoids”, World Policy Journal, 12(1), Spring 1995: 19.
Kiljunen, Kimmo and Vanhanen, Matti, “Report of the Council of State on Finland’s Positions concerning the Future of Europe and Issues Arisen during the Convention”. CONV 509/03.
Kuneva, Meglena, Intervention at the Convention on the Future of European Union on 30-31 May 2003.
Laffan, Brigid, “The European Union Polity: a Union of Regulatory, Normative and Cognitive Pillars”, Journal of European Public Policy, 8(5), October 2001, pp. 709-721.
Landman, Todd, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, 2nd ed., London and New York: Loutledge, 2003.
Langhammer, Rolf, “Regional Integration APEC Style: Lessons from Regional Integration EU Style”, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 16(1), April 1999: 1-17.
Moravcsik, Andrew and Nicolaidis, Kalypso, “Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(1): 59-86.
Nahtigal, Matia, Intervention at the Convention on the Future of European Union on 11-12 July 2002.
Niblett, Robin, “France and Europe at the End of the Cold War: Resisting Change”, in Robin Niblett and William Wallace eds., Rethinking Europe Order: West European Reponses, 1989-1997, New York: Palgrave, 2001, 89-123.
Oleksy, Jozef, Intervention at the Convention on the Future of European Union on 15-16 May 2003.
Oxley, Alan, “APEC Needs a Wake Up Call more than Trade Liberalization”, Australian APEC Study Centre Network Conference at Nankai University, China, on 18 May 2001.
Oxley, Alan, “AUSFTA – A ‘Plus’ Agreement: A Plus for Australia, ‘WTO Plus’ and a Plus for APEC”. Paper presented at Australian APEC Study Centre on 1 March 2004.
Peterson, John, “Decision-making in the European Union: towards a Framework for Analysis”, Journal of European Public Policy, 2(1), March 1995: 69-93.
Philippart, Eric and Ho, Monika, “Flexibility and Models of Governance for the EU”, in Grainne de Burca and Joanne Scott eds., Constitutional Change in the EU – From Uniformity to Flexibility?, Oxford: Portland: Hart, 2001: 299-336.
Pierson, Paul, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis”, Comparative Political Studies, 29(2), 1996: 123-163.
Ravenhill, John, “The New Bilateralism in the Asia Pacific”, Third World Quarterly, 24(2), 2003: .
Scott, Richard, Institutions and Organizations, London: Sage, 1995.
Severin, Adria, Intervention at the Convention on the Future of European Union on the 30-31 May 2003.
Smith, Brendan, Constitution Building in the European Union, The Hague, London and New York: Kluwer Law International.
Soutou, Georges, L’alliance incertaine, Paris: Fayard, 1996.
Stubb, Alexander, “A Categorization of Differentiated Integration”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(2), June 1996: 283-295.
Usher, J. A., “Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation”, in T Heukel, Neils Blokker and Marcel Brus, eds., The European Union after Amsterdam: A Legal Analysis, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998: 253-272.
Wallace, William, “Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: The Community as a Political System”, in Helen Wallace et al., Policy-making in the European Community, 2nd ed., Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1983: 403-436.
Warleigh, Alex, Flexible Integration: Which Model for the European Union?, New York: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002.
Webber, Douglas, “Two Funerals and a Wedding? The Ups and Downs of Regionalism in East Asia and Asia- Pacific after the Asian Crisis”, The Pacific Review, 14(3), 2001: 339-372.
Wei, Shang-jin and Frankel, Jeffrey A., “Can Regional Blocs Be a Stepping Stone to Global Free Trade? A Political Economy Analysis”, International Review of Economics and Finance, 5(4), 1996: 339-347.

Documents from the websites:

APEC official website. http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec.html (​http:​/​​/​www.apec.org​/​apec​/​about_apec.html​), accessed on 20 January 2005.
A Partnership of Nations. The British Approach to the European Union IGC 1996, 13 March 1996”. http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/general/fiches/1-28.htm (​http:​/​​/​europa.eu.int​/​en​/​agenda​/​igc-home​/​general​/​fiches​/​1-28.htm​), accessed on 20 February 2005.
Communication écrite du gouvernement 1995/1996: 30 sur la CIG de 1996 transmis au Piksdag le 30 novembre 1995. http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/general/fiches/1-28.htm (​http:​/​​/​europa.eu.int​/​en​/​agenda​/​igc-home​/​general​/​fiches​/​1-28.htm​), accessed on 20 February 2005. 
Conference Given by Mr. Goncalves, Member of the Reflection Group, 22 September 1995. http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/general/fiches/1-28.htm (​http:​/​​/​europa.eu.int​/​en​/​agenda​/​igc-home​/​general​/​fiches​/​1-28.htm​), accessed on 20 February 2005. 
Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 11 January 1994. http://www.nato.int (​http:​/​​/​www.nato.int​), accessed on 12 January 2005.
Danish government Paper ‘Basis for Negotiation – an Open Europe – IGC 96, on 30 November 1995’. http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/general/fiches/1-28.htm (​http:​/​​/​europa.eu.int​/​en​/​agenda​/​igc-home​/​general​/​fiches​/​1-28.htm​), accessed on 20 February 2005.
Finland’s Points of Departure and Objectives at the European Union’s Intergovernmental Conference in 1996, Report to the Parliament, 27 February 1996” http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/general/fiches/1-28.htm (​http:​/​​/​europa.eu.int​/​en​/​agenda​/​igc-home​/​general​/​fiches​/​1-28.htm​), accessed on 20 February 2005. 
For a Democratical European Union with Political and Social Content, Greece’s Contribution to the 1996 IGC, 22 March 1996. http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/general/fiches/1-28.htm (​http:​/​​/​europa.eu.int​/​en​/​agenda​/​igc-home​/​general​/​fiches​/​1-28.htm​), accessed on 20 February 2005.
Mémorandum Benelux en vue de la CIG, 7 mars 1996”. http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/general/fiches/1-28.htm (​http:​/​​/​europa.eu.int​/​en​/​agenda​/​igc-home​/​general​/​fiches​/​1-28.htm​), accessed on 20 February 2005. 
Mémorandum Benelux en vue de la CIG, 7 mars 1996”, “Challenges and Opportunities Abroad: Irish White Paper on Foreign Policy, 26 March 1996”, http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/general/fiches/1-28.htm (​http:​/​​/​europa.eu.int​/​en​/​agenda​/​igc-home​/​general​/​fiches​/​1-28.htm​), accessed on 20 February 2005. 

































^1	  William Wallace, “Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: The Community as a Political System”, in Helen Wallace et al., Policy-making in the European Community, 2nd ed., Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1983: 403-436.
^2	  APEC official website. http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec.html, accessed on January 20, 2005.
^3	  Ibid.
^4	  See for example Douglas Webber, “Two Funerals and a Wedding? The Ups and Downs of Regionalism in East Asia and Asia- Pacific after the Asian Crisis”, The Pacific Review, 14(3), 2001: 339-372.
^5	  Todd Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, 2nd ed., London and New York: Loutledge, 2003: 29.
^6	  Miles Kahler, “A World of Blocs: Facts and Factoids”, World Policy Journal, 12(1), Spring 1995: 19.
^7	  Rolf Langhammer, “Regional Integration APEC Style: Lessons from Regional Integration EU Style”, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 16(1), April 1999: 1-17.
^8	  Brian Denman, “The Emergence of Trans-Regional Educational Exchange Schemes (TREES) in Europe, North America, and the Asia-Pacific Region”, Higher Education in Europe, 26(1), 2001: 95-108.
^9	  Shang-jin Wei and Jeffrey A. Frankel, “Can Regional Blocs Be a Stepping Stone to Global Free Trade? A Political Economy Analysis”, International Review of Economics and Finance, 5(4), 1996: 339-347.
^10	  Andrew Elek, “Open Regionalism Going Global: APEC and the New Transatlantic Economic Partnership”, Pacific Economic Paper, No. 286, December 1998: 1-32.
^11	  Chin-peng Chu, “Regionalism and Regional Integration in the Asia-Pacific and the European Union: Theoretical Discussion and Development Experience”, in Christopher M. Dent and David W.F. Huang eds., Northeast Asian Regionalism: Learning from the European Union, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002: 34-64.
^12	  Ken Endo, “The Security Foundations of Economic Integration: A Comparison between East Asia and Western Europe”, in Christopher M. Dent and David W.F. Huang eds., Northeast Asian Regionalism: Learning from the European Union, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002: 226-242.
^13	  Landmand, op. cit.
^14	  Shengen Agreement signed on 14 June 1985.
^15	  Webber, op. cit.: 340.
^16	  Ibid.
^17	  Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 11 January 1994.
^18	  Georges Soutou, L’alliance incertaine, Paris: Fayard, 1996: 192.
^19	  APEC Shanghai Accord, adopted by APEC Economic Leaders on 21 October 2001.
^20	  See chapters II and VIII in Brendan Smith, Constitution Building in the European Union, The Hague, London and New York: Kluwer Law International, pp. 23-33, 227-243.
^21	  Paul Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis”, Comparative Political Studies, 29(2), 1996: 123-163.
^22	  Interview by author with a Belgian official in the COREPER, 10 November 2004.
^23	  Interview by author with an official from Austria Delegation to the EU, 23 November 2004.
^24	  Interview by author with an official from Chinese Taipei participating in SOM of APEC between 1997 and 2002.
^25	  Pierson, op. cit. and Smith, op. cit., pp. 227-243.
^26	  John Peterson, “Decision-making in the European Union: towards a Framework for Analysis”, Journal of European Public Policy, 2(1), March 1995, pp. 69-93.
^27	  Brigid Laffan, “The European Union Polity: a Union of Regulatory, Normative and Cognitive Pillars”, Journal of European Public Policy, 8(5), October 2001: 709-721.
^28	  Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations, London: Sage, 1995: 37.
^29	  Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, Political Studies, 44(5), 1999: 939.
^30	  Charels Grant, Deors – Inside the House that Jacques Built, London: Nicholas Brealey, 1994: 128-143.
^31	  Soutou, op. cit.: 400.
^32	  Alan Oxley, “APEC Needs a Wake Up Call more than Trade Liberalization”, Australian APEC Study Centre Network Conference at Nankai University, China, on 18 May 2001.
^33	  In APEC jargon, lead country or economy refers to the member country that initiates the proposal and later conducts the policy after the proposal is endorsed.
^34	  Graeme John Hugo, “Regional Patterns of International Cooperation on Migration Issues in Asia, Present and Future: Australia”, Keynote Report.
^35	  Ibid.
^36	  They are Australia, Brunei, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Taiwan, Singapore and Thailand.
^37	  The following categorization is mainly with reference to Alexander Stubb, “A Categorization of Differentiated Integration”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(2), June 1996: 283-295.
^38	  Robin Niblett, “France and Europe at the End of the Cold War: Resisting Change”, in Robin Niblett and William Wallace eds., Rethinking Europe Order: West European Reponses, 1989-1997, New York: Palgrave, 2001: 104-105.
^39	  “Declaration of Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac to President of European Council, 7 December 1995”.
^40	  Fred Bergsten, “Towards a Tripartite World”, The Economist, 15 July 2000: 22.
^41	  Interview by author with an official from Chinese Taipei participating in CTI since 1999.
^42	  Alan Oxley, op. cit.: 2.
^43	  John Ravenhill, “The New Bilateralism in the Asia Pacific”, Third World Quarterly, 24(2), 2003: 305.
^44	  Alan Oxley, “AUSFTA – A ‘Plus’ Agreement: A Plus for Australia, ‘WTO Plus’ and a Plus for APEC”: 1.
^45	  APEC Document, 2002/SOM III/002.
^46	  Interview by author with an official from Chinese Taipei working at APEC secretariat between 1994 and 2001 on 6 January 2005.
^47	  Ibid.
^48	  Smith, op. cit.: 136-161.
^49	  Interview by author with a Belgian official from Attichi on 10 November 2004.
^50	  “Danish government Paper ‘Basis for Negotiation – an Open Europe – IGC 96, on 30 November 1995’. http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/general/fiches/1-28.htm, accessed on 20 February 2005.
^51	  “Mémorandum Benelux en vue de la CIG, 7 mars 1996”, “Challenges and Opportunities Abroad: Irish White Paper on Foreign Policy, 26 March 1996”, “Finland’s Points of Departure and Objectives at the European Union’s Intergovernmental Conference in 1996, Report to the Parliament, 27 February 1996” and “Communication écrite du gouvernement 1995/1996: 30 sur la CIG de 1996 transmis au Piksdag le 30 novembre 1995”. http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/general/fiches/1-28.htm, accessed on 20 February 2005. 
^52	  “For a Democratical European Union with Political and Social Content, Greece’s Contribution to the 1996 IGC, 22 March 1996”. http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/general/fiches/1-28.htm, accessed on 20 February 2005.
^53	  “Mémorandum Benelux en vue de la CIG, 7 mars 1996”, “Conference Given by Mr. Goncalves, Member of the Reflection Group, 22 September 1995”, “Position of the Italian Government on the Intergovernmental Conference for the Revision of the Treaties, 18 March 1996”.  http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/general/fiches/1-28.htm, accessed on 20 February 2005.
^54	  “A Partnership of Nations. The British Approach to the European Union IGC 1996, 13 March 1996”. http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/general/fiches/1-28.htm, accessed on 20 February 2005.
^55	  Shanghai Accord, adopted by APEC Economic Leaders on 21 October 2001.
^56	  Interview by author with an official from Chinese Taipei working at APEC secretariat between 1994 and 2001 on 10 January 2005.
^57	  Ibid.
^58	  2004 Committee on Trade and Investment Annual Report to Ministers, Appendix IV.
^59	  APEC document 2002/SOM III/002.
^60	  J. A. Usher, “Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation”, in T Heukel, Neils Blokker and Marcel Brus  eds., The European Union after Amsterdam: A Legal Analysis, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998: 267-268.
^61	  Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(1), 1999: 80.
^62	  “Statement to Implement APEC Policies on Trade and the Digital Economy, Annex A. Los Cabos, Mexico on 27 October 2002, Bangkok, Thailand on 21 October 2003.”
^63	  Andrew Duff, “Do We Really Need Enhanced Cooperation?”, CONV 759/03.
^64	  Alex Warleigh, Flexible Integration: Which Model for the European Union?, New York: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002: 4-5.
^65	  Lamberto Dini, “The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”. CONV 180/02.
^66	  Kimmo Kiljunen and Matti Vanhanen, “Report of the Council of State on Finland’s Positions concerning the Future of Europe and Issues Arisen during the Convention”. CONV 509/03.
^67	  Warleigh, op. cit., pp. 4-6; Eric Philippart and Monika Ho, “Flexibility and Models of Governance for the EU”, in Grainne de Burca and Joanne Scott eds., Constitutional Change in the EU – From Uniformity to Flexibility?, Oxford: Portland: Hart, 2001: 334-335.
^68	  Dini, op. cit.
^69	  Interview by author with an official from Chinese Taipei working at APEC secretariat between 1994 and 2001 on 10 January 2005.
^70	  Niblett, op. cit.
^71	  Interview by author with Georges Soutou on 24 November 2004.
^72	  Flash Eurobarometer 159/2: 36.
^73	  Interview by author with a Belgian official in the COREPER, 10 November 2004.
^74	  Adria Severin, “Intervention at the Convention on the Future of European Union on the 30-31 May 2003.
^75	  Meglena Kuneva, Intervention at the Convention on the Future of European Union on 30-31 May 2003.
^76	  Jozef Oleksy, Intervention at the Convention on the Future of European Union on 15-16 May 2003.
^77	  Matia Nahtigal, Intervention at the Convention on the Future of European Union on 11-12 July 2002.
^78	  Duff, op. cit.
